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Abstract 
   
We analyze an economy with two main features: labor mobility goes together 
with knowledge transfer and firm productivity increases with the exchange of 
ideas. Each firm develops some specific knowledge that will be transmitted to 
the rest of the industry through the mobility of workers. We study two labor 
market settings and use comparative statics to derive the implications of the 
model. They reveal how labor mobility depends on the variety and level of 
knowledge, the presence of mobility costs, the institutional environment, the 
absorptive capacity of the firms and the size of the industry. Results are robust 
to different labor market settings. 
 
Resum 
Analitzem una economia amb dues característiques principals: la mobilitat 
dels treballadors implica transferència de coneixement i la productivitat de 
l’empresa augmenta amb l’intercanvi de coneixement. Cada empresa 
desenvolupa un tipus de coneixement que serà trasmès a la resta de la 
indústria mitjançant la mobilitat de treballadors. Estudiem dues estructures de 
mercat laboral i utilitzant un anàlisi comparatiu derivem les implicacions del 
model. Els resultats revelen com la mobilitat de treballadors depèn en la 
varietat i nivell del coneixement, la presència de costos de mobilitat, les 
institucions, la capacitat d’absorvir coneixement per part de les empreses i la 
mida de la indústria. Els resultats no depenen de l’estructura del mercat 
laboral. 
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1. Introduction 
Knowledge diffusion has long been recognized as very important for 
innovation and productivity. It is not enough that new ideas are created to increase 
productivity, but they need to be spread and used in the economy in order to obtain 
their benefit. In this paper we propose an alternative way to model knowledge 
diffusion through labor mobility. In contrast to the seminal papers on endogenous 
growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988, and Romer, 1990) which are based on 
exogenous knowledge spillovers, we explicitly set the mechanism through which 
knowledge gets diffused into the economy, and although in this paper we present a 
static analysis, we believe our approach can also be applied in a dynamic setting. 
There are several papers already dealing with knowledge diffusion through labor 
mobility from a theoretical approach, but they are not within the neoclassical 
framework. 
In our model knowledge is transferred across firms via high-skilled labor 
mobility. Even where intellectual property rights are well-protected, tacit 
knowledge is embodied in the workers and can be used by any firm who hires 
them. We assume that there are several firms in the industry. Each of them has 
developed a particular type of knowledge, which is embodied in its workers. Then 
each firm can learn external knowledge by hiring workers from other firms. The 
exchange of different types of knowledge, and the subsequent positive effect on 
productivity and innovation, can only occur when the different types of workers 
work in the same firm. The model reveals new insights into the patterns of labor 
mobility within an industry. 
Theoretical literature on workers' flows across firms is scarce. It is mostly 
within labor economics and industrial organization that this topic is developed. We 
can classify this research into three different strands. A first strand models labor 
mobility as the result of optimal investment decisions and it is very related to    4
human capital theory. Young workers look for jobs with a high learning 
component. When they get older, they move with their acquired human capital 
towards better paid jobs and less learning opportunities. Rosen (1972), Jovanovic 
and Nyarko (1995) and Moen (2005) are in this line. The main issue in these papers 
is to disentangle who has incentives to pay for the general training. 
The second group, which follows Pakes and Nitzan (1983), introduces an 
element of specificity in the learning-in-the-job that allows workers to get some 
rents. Competitors are willing to pay high wages to experienced workers to learn 
their embodied specific knowledge, so workers will either move to competitors or 
be better-paid by their current employer who wants to retain them. Fosfuri, Motta 
and Ronde (2001) use the latter argument to analyze whether a firm should export 
or go multinational. If it goes multinational, its technology may become spread into 
the local firms through labor mobility. In Franco and Filson (2005), workers 
evaluate whether to start up a new firm after having learned-in-the-job. Combes 
and Duranton (2006) are also in this strand of literature while considering a model 
of reciprocal poaching of labor. In their paper, clustering decision of firms depends 
on product market competition and workers heterogeneity in terms of knowledge 
transfer cost. As rivalry in product market competition intensifies, firms get more 
concerned about keeping information private, so they pay higher wages to their 
workers in order to prevent them from moving to competitors. 
Still within this second group, but from an industrial organization approach, 
Fosfuri and Ronde (2004) and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) use labor mobility 
to transfer knowledge across firms. Fosfuri and Ronde (2004) have a two-firm two-
period model with cumulative innovation where technology spillovers arise through 
labor mobility. According to their results, firms are more likely to cluster when the 
growth potential of an industry is high, competition in the product market is soft 
and probability of a firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very    5
low. Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) show that the effect of product market 
competition on incentives to innovate depends on spillovers being endogenous or 
exogenous. One of the main issues studied in this research line is the interaction 
between labor mobility and imperfect competition in the product market. 
A third strand of literature uses matching models where labor mobility brings 
higher productivity in the economy through the reallocation of mismatched 
workers. In general, though, they do not assume any diffusion of knowledge with 
the mobility of workers. Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990) and Cooper (2001) are two 
examples of this literature. 
Our work looks at labor mobility and knowledge diffusion from a new 
perspective within the neoclassical framework. Firstly, instead of focusing on the 
interaction between labor mobility and human capital, product market competition 
or labor market mismatches, we look at how several institutional and sectoral 
variables affect labor mobility. Secondly, we have a continuum of workers in each 
firm (as in Combes and Duranton, 2001, 2006), while in most of the literature there 
is only one worker per firm. With multiplicity of workers per firm, the ability to 
retain workers becomes less trivial. Furthermore, we enlarge the analysis to N 
firms, which until now had only been done in a matching model setup. 
The paper is divided into four further sections. Next, we present the basic 
model in a framework of perfect competition and derive the equilibrium outcome. 
In section 3 we do a comparative static analysis of this equilibrium to see how labor 
mobility and wages are affected by different parameters. In section 4 we reconsider 
the model by relaxing the perfect competition assumption in the labor market, 
which may seem too strong for this model. In particular firms now set wages to 
experienced workers and we allow them to have an advantage over their rivals 
when offering wages to their own workers. We show that the main results of the 
basic model remain unchanged. In section 5 we derive the empirical implications of    6
our model, which as we showed in section 4 do not depend on the assumption of 
perfect competition in the labor market. Finally we summarize the results. 
 
2. The model 
The model proposed here is a static one with labor mobility. We assume that 
knowledge is developed within each firm, but valuable to the whole industry. There 
are  N  firms in the economy. They are identical in everything, but in the specific 
knowledge they have, which is embodied in their experienced workers. Workers 
live for two periods only. Each period there is a continuum supply of young 
workers with measure  NΛ, who do not have any labor experience ( ++ Λ∈ℜ ). 
Assume that in period 0, a measure Λ of young workers work in each firm. 
Without loss of generality and for the rest of the paper we will assume that  =1 Λ , so 
that in total there is a measure N  of young workers in the economy and each firm 
hires a measure 1 of these workers. We can think that each firm requires a fixed 
amount of research assistants or unskilled workers, independently of the type of 
research or production they are pursuing. By working in the firm they learn some 
specific knowledge without any cost (learning-by-doing), so that, at the beginning 
of period 1, there is a measure 1 of senior workers with the knowledge developed 
in each firm. We call them experienced workers. 
In period 1 firms may hire their own experienced workers and external 
experienced workers. Denote by 
j
i λ  the amount of experienced workers from firm 
j that are hired by firm i,  j i ≠ .
1 As already stated above, they have embodied 
knowledge type  j. We call them poached workers. Similarly, let 
i
i λ  be the amount 
of own experienced workers hired by the same firm i, which have knowledge type 
                                                 
1 Notice that since we normalized Λ to 1, 
j
i λ  also corresponds to the fraction of workers of firm 
j  that are hired by firm i.    7
i. They are called retained workers. 
The production function of each firm is 
1 = ii i YH L
α α −  where  i H  is a measure of 
human capital and  i L  is the total young employment of firm i  (= 1 , . . . ) iN . For 
simplicity, we do not include physical capital in the model. The amount of young 
workers hired by each firm is assumed exogenous and with measure 1, so we can 
simplify further the production function to  = ii YH
α . We define human capital as an 
asymmetric CES function on all types of experienced workers hired by the firm.  
 
1
=( ) ( ) ,
ij








⎝⎠ ∑  (1) 
 where  j k  is an indicator of the specific type of knowledge of firm  j and  p 
is a parameter which lies between 0 and 1 and measures how much a firm can 
access external knowledge. This parameter  p includes three factors: one refers to 
the intrinsic characteristics of the knowledge in question (whether it is firm or 
industry-specific); the second factor is the degree of capacity of firms to acquire 
such external knowledge (concept of absorptive capacity of firms developed by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990), and finally, the type of environment where firms 
develop their tasks (e.g. institutions, local legal system which may enforce or not 
clauses not-to-compete, strongly defend trade secrets, etc.).
2 Notice that the 
asymmetry appears because we assume that knowledge from own workers (
i
i λ ) is 
fully accessible by the firm while knowledge from poached workers may be less 
accessible ( [ ] 0,1 p∈ ). 
Knowledge in our model has two dimensions: variety and level of 
                                                 
2 There is empirical evidence that shows how important differences in legal systems may be in 
determining the rate of labor mobility of a region. Hyde (1998), Gilson (1999) and Valetta (2002) 
argue that Silicon Valley was originated in California precisely because there clauses not-to-
compete have weak enforceability. Almeida and Kogut (1999) point out at the importance of 
"social institutions that support a viable flow of ideas within the spatial confines of regional    8
knowledge. The subindex in  i k  indicates the type of knowledge, while the level of 
knowledge is indicated by the particular value of k . As an illustration, imagine that 
each type of knowledge is a particular color, while the level of knowledge refers to 
the intensity of each color. We do not assume anything about the level of 
knowledge, that is, each firm may or may not have a different level of knowledge. 
In this way, the equilibrium outcome we obtain is a general one. 
With such specifications, we obtain a functional form for output similar to 
the one derived in Romer (1990), but instead of different types of capital goods, 
here we have different types of human capital. In the conventional specification, 
total human capital is implicitly defined as being proportional to the sum of all the 
types of human capital, assuming perfect substitutability among them. The model 
here considers the case in which all types of human capital have additively 
separable effects on output. This means that each type of human capital does not 
affect the marginal productivity of the rest of human capital types.  
  =( ) ( ) .
ij
ii i i j ji Yk p k
α α λλ
≠ + ∑   
The production function stresses the importance of variety of knowledge by 
its additive form. Notice that with such functional form it is not obvious a priori 
that there will be labor mobility in equilibrium since having one type of knowledge 
is sufficient for production.
3 We assume decreasing returns to all types of 
experienced workers (0< <1 α ). It seems plausible that the amount of new 
knowledge that a worker adds to the firm is lower the more workers of his type are 
already hired by that firm. Moreover, we assume that without workers there is no 
access to the knowledge. Notice how productivity increases with the exchange of 
ideas. When the firm only hires workers with the same type of knowledge, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
economies" for creating the externalities that foster innovation (p.916). 
3 In contrast, by assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas type function on all inputs, 
complementarities among types of knowledge would make of labor mobility a trivial result.    9
maximum productivity it can achieve is  i k
α, with i indicating the type of 
knowledge of the workers hired. On the other hand, when the firm hires the same 
amount of workers but with different knowledge, its productivity may get higher 
values thanks to the assumed concavity. 
We assume perfect competition in the product market to be able to isolate the 
exchange of knowledge effect on the labor market.
4 To simplify we assume that all 
firms can sell all the product at a given price, which we normalize to 1. Hence, we 
do not consider here how imperfect product market competition may affect the 
results. 
As mentioned above, at the beginning of the period there is a measure 1 of 
experienced workers with each type of knowledge in the industry. Moreover, there 
is a positive cost for workers to move from one firm to the other, which we denote 
by  m. We can think of it as the cost of changing place of residence, for instance. 
We consider first the case of perfect competition in the labor market, so that firms 
take wages as given.
5 Let  j ω  be the wage to experienced workers type  j working 
in firm  j. A worker will move to another firm if and only if he is paid for the 
mobility costs, that is, if he gets  j m ω + . Then, an experienced worker poached by 
another firm will get  j m ω + , while his colleague who is retained by firm  j gets  j ω . 
Then, each firm i decides the amount 
i
i λ  of own experienced workers to retain and 
the amount 
j
i λ  of experienced workers to poach from each firm  j () j i ≠ . 
                                                 
4 We can think that either owners of the firms consume the product produced themselves or they 
sell it to a large competitive market. 
5 At this point, some reader may think that the firm that hires workers when young should have 
some power on deciding their wage when workers get experienced. In section 4 we present a set-
up where firms offer a wage to their own workers before any other firm does. This gives them an 
advantage not considered in the perfect competition case. However, although it introduces some 
inefficiency, the main results remain the same.    10
The firm faces the following problem:
 6  
  { } () ( ) ( ) max ,
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∗ is independent of i, meaning that firms that poach workers 




∗∗  for all i,  j. Notice that since marginal productivity of poached workers at 
=0
j
i λ  is infinity for all  , ij  and there is no cost of adapting variety of knowledge, 
all firms will poach workers from all the other firms in the industry to access to the 
whole range of knowledge in the economy.
7 Moreover, firms will always want to 
retain some of their own workers because the marginal productivity of retained 
workers when the firm retains zero workers is infinite. Nevertheless, these 
conditions are not necessary to obtain positive labor mobility in equilibrium. The 
necessary condition for positive labor mobility is that the marginal productivity of a 
type i worker when all workers of type i are working for firm i is lower than the 
marginal productivity of the first worker of type i that moves to any other firm. 
Similarly, the condition for having some retained workers in equilibrium is that the 
marginal productivity of the first retained worker is higher than the marginal 
productivity of this type of worker in any other firm when all workers of his type 
are working for that firm. 
The market clearing conditions for this equilibrium are  
                                                 
6Notice that since the firm has an additively-separable production function, it faces N  independent one-variable 
maximization problems. 
7We could limit the number of firms from which to poach workers by introducing a cost of adaptation of external 
knowledge which increases with the variety of knowledge. This would complicate the analysis without giving any 
new insights into the model.    11







+ ∀ ∑  (4) 
  where the left-hand-side (from now on LHS) is demand for experienced 
workers of type i and the right-hand-side (RHS) is its supply. They can be 
rewritten as  (1 )= 1
ii
i N λλ
∗∗ +−   i ∀  because there are  N  firms in the industry and from 
equation (3) we know that  =
ii
j λ λ
∗ ∗  , jj i ∀ ≠ . Note that the these equilibrium 
conditions are independent across types of labor. For each type i of labor, total 
demand depends only on  i ω . 





∗ and  i ω
∗ for all i, which 
are determined by equations (2), (3) and (4). Substituting the first order conditions 
















+− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (5) 
Putting together all the equilibrium conditions we obtain that the net 
marginal productivity of experienced workers (marginal productivity net of 
mobility costs) should be the same, independently whether they are retained or 
poached by another firm,  
 
11 (1 ( 1) ) = ( ) .
ii
ii Nk p k m
αα αα αλ α λ
∗− ∗− −− −  (6) 
This condition determines the equilibrium decision on the number of 
poached workers 
i λ
∗ by each firm. Market clearing condition ensures that 
i λ
∗ is an 
interior solution.
8 In fact, since marginal productivity of the first poached worker is 
infinite, and the same happens with retained workers, we obtain an interior 
                                                 
8 On one side, 
i λ
∗ must be non-negative (we can not poach a negative amount of workers), and 
on the other side, the total demand of workers can not exceed the supply of such workers, or in 
other words, the firm can not retain a negative amount of workers. Mathematically, 
=( 1 ) 1
jj
i ij N λλ
∗∗
≠ −≤ ∑ . Hence, 
j λ





⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
 to have an interior 
equilibrium.    12
equilibrium in 
i λ
∗ (check the appendix for details). Notice also that the equilibrium 
wage and the labor mobility rate are a function of the level of knowledge of the 
firm:  () ii k ω
∗  and  ()
i
i k λ
∗ . Thus, in general the equilibrium is not symmetric. Only 
when the levels of knowledge are the same among firms, labor mobility and wages 
are symmetric in equilibrium. The proof of the following proposition is in the 
appendix. 
Proposition 1 In an economy with perfect competition in the labor market, there 
exists a unique equilibrium, given by the vector of wages and labor mobility 
({} { } { } =1 =1 =1 ,,
N N N ij
iii i ii ωλλ ) satisfying equations (2), (3) and (4). This equilibrium displays 
positive labor mobility.   
Note that there is no friction in this economy; that is, markets are all 
perfectly competitive and there are no market failures. Hence, the equilibrium 
solution is efficient. 
 
3. Comparative static analysis 
We proceed now to check the comparative statics of the previous 
equilibrium. We are interested in analyzing how labor mobility and wages for 
experienced workers change with each parameter of the model. This analysis will 
allow us to better understand the functioning of the model. 
We would expect that an increase in  p (the level of transferability of 
knowledge) will result in higher labor mobility and higher wages, since it increases 
the value of poached workers for the hiring firm. Firms are able to extract more 
knowledge from every poached worker they hire, which translates into more value. 
Thus, they are willing to hire more poached workers and pay them better. And this 
is what happens in equilibrium. The marginal productivity of poached workers is 
higher when  p increases, while the marginal productivity of retained workers    13
remains the same. Thus, a firm is hiring more of poached workers to equalize back 
the two marginal productivities.
9 This effect increases the demand for each type of 


















Figure 1. Determination of the level of labor mobility 
for the basic model (from equation (6)). 
   
 
 
Figure 2. Determination of wage for the basic model  
(from equation (5')). 
                                                 
9 It can be illustrated in Figure 1. An increase in  p  shifts the RHS of equation (6) to the right, 
while the LHS remains the same. Thus, the new equilibrium has higher labor mobility. 
10 Similarly as before, we can illustrate this result in Figure 2. The RHS of equation (5') shifts to 














-m    14
Mobility cost m is a real cost in this model. This means that higher mobility 
costs reduce the total final output of a firm. Thus, when mobility costs increase, 
firms prefer to substitute some of their poached workers for more retained workers 
who do not incur mobility costs, reducing labor mobility in equilibrium. At the 
same time this results in lower demand for each type of experienced worker, so 
wages also decline.
11 Notice however that while total wage for retained workers 
( i ω
∗) decreases, the total wage for poached workers ( i m ω
∗ + ) must increase so that 
poaching decreases.
12 
To analyze the effects of an increase in the level of knowledge on labor 
mobility we have to consider two cases. When mobility costs are zero, then the 
level of knowledge has no effect on labor mobility because it affects in the same 
way the marginal productivity of workers that stay in the firm and of those that are 
poached by other firms.
13 In contrast, when mobility costs are positive, then an 
increase in the level of knowledge type i increases labor mobility of this type of 
labor. In any case, an increase in the level of knowledge leads to an increase in the 
wage for the worker with this knowledge through a higher demand of such 
workers.
14 
A larger industry size (N ) or, equivalently in our model a larger variety of 
knowledge, increases the demand for each type of experienced workers. This is 
because there are more firms interested in poaching them. The result of this 
                                                 
11 We can illustrate these results similarly as in the  p  analysis. However, now the RHS moves 
to the left in both figures, which reduces the equilibrium levels of labor mobility and wages. 
12 The market clearing equation have to keep holding. Firms retain more workers and poach less 
external workers. It must be that wage for retained has decreased and wages for poached workers 
overall has increased. 
13 This result needs of the assumption of separability between different types of experienced 
workers and it would not hold in the case of a production function with complementarities among 
them. 
14 Take Figure 2 and see how an increase in k  shifts both curves RHS and LHS to the right, 
giving a new equilibrium with a higher wage than before. To see the change in labor mobility    15
increase in demand, given the fact that supply is inelastic, is an increase in wages. 
And it is because of these higher wages that then firms poach less experienced 
workers from each firm in equilibrium. Notice, however, that the same higher 
wages makes firms retain less workers, so the total amount of labor mobility in the 
new equilibrium ((1 )
j N λ
∗ − ) increases. 
We summarize the previous results in the following proposition. The formal 
proof of these results can be found in the appendix. 
Proposition 2. 1) An increase in  p results in higher labor mobility and higher 
wages in equilibrium. 
2) An increase in m results in lower labor mobility and lower wages for 
retained workers in equilibrium. However, poached workers get a higher salary, 
i m ω
∗ + . 
3) An increase in N  results in lower 
i λ
∗ and higher wages. The total amount 
of labor mobility, (1 )
i N λ
∗ − , increases with  N . 
4) If  =0 m , then an increase in  i k  does not have any effect on the equilibrium 
level of labor mobility. 
5) If  >0 m , then an increase in  i k  has a positive effect on the equilibrium 
level of labor mobility for type-i labor. 
6) An increase in  i k  unambiguously increases equilibrium wage  i ω
∗.   
 
4. The model with imperfect competition in the labor market 
As in the previous model we have N  firms, each of which hires a fixed 
amount of young workers. These young workers learn the specific knowledge 
developed in the firm as a by-product of production and they become experienced 
workers in the following period. It is as experienced workers that they can move to 
                                                                                                                                                              
check the appendix.    16
competitors or keep working for the same firm. Until now, we were assuming that 
firms can not influence the market price for these workers, so they took wages as 
given. However, one can argue that firms may try to agree on a wage with their 
own experienced workers before these go to check the external market. Firms may 
have easier access to their own workers, who are unique because they have 
embodied a specific type of knowledge. Would this affect the previous results? If 
so, in which direction? These are the questions we want to answer in this section. 
For that, we develop a sequential game for the previous economy. 
At the beginning of the period there is a measure 1 of experienced workers 
with each type of knowledge in the industry. Then, the stages of the game within 
period 1 are the following: 
Stage 1- Each firm i commits to a wage  i ω   ( =1,2,... ) iN  to its own 
experienced workers, which are of type i. 
Stage 2- Each firm i offers a wage 
j
i r  (, =1 , . . . , i j N  and  ) i j ≠  to experienced 
workers of the other firms, where  j refers to the type of experienced worker. If 
j
ij rm ω ≥+ , where m is a positive mobility cost, then firm i may choose how many 
workers to hire from firm  j, which we denote by 
j
i λ  and refer to as poached 
workers. Otherwise, firm i can not poach any worker type- j. 
Stage 3- Production takes place, products are sold at price 1 in an external 
market and firms get their profits. 
We changed perfect competition in the labor market to allow firms to set 
wages to experienced workers in the following order: first, to retained workers, and 
then to poached workers. This is to give firms the first-mover advantage over their 
own workers commented above. Notice that now firms do not decide how many 
workers to retain, but this variable will come from the feasibility condition 
=1 .
ii
ij ji λ λ
≠ −∑     17
We use backward induction to solve the game. Stage 3 does not involve any 
decision from the firm. In stage 2 firms decide first 
j
i r  and then 
j
i λ  taking as given 
the decisions  i ω  for all i. The problem they face is the following:  
  =( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) max ,
ii j i j j
jj r j ii j i j i i ji ji ji ji ii kp k r
αα α λ λω λ λ λ ≠≠ ≠ ≠ Π− + − − − ∑∑ ∑ ∑   
     .. ,
j
ij str m ω ≥+  
     01
j
i λ ≤ ≤ .  
Since 
j
i r  enters as a cost only, the firm wants to minimize it as much as 




∗ +  (7) 
To determine the optimal number of workers to be poached from firm  j we 
need to derive the first order condition of the problem, and after straightforward 





















∗ is independent of i, meaning that firms that poach workers 




∗∗  for all  , ij . By second-order condition we know that the interior solution is 
a global maximum 
2





In stage 1, firms decide the wage of their experienced workers, taking into 
account how this decision will influence the poaching decision of the other firms. 
Firm 
' i s problem is then to choose  i ω  to maximize profits given the optimal 
response function for poaching. The general problem
15 is 
                                                 
15 Although concavity of the problem is not satisfied for all non-negative  i ω , it can be proved    18
[(1 ( )) ( ( ) ) ] (1 ( )) ( ) ( ), max 0
ij i j
j ii ij j i j i j ij ji ji ji ji i kp k m
αα α
ω λ ωλ ω ω λ ω ω λ ω
∗∗ ∗ ∗
≠≠ ≠ ≠ −+ − − − + ≥ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
 
which gives the following first order condition:  
 














∂∂ ∑∑ ∑ ∑  (9) 
By increasing the wage  i ω  the firm can retain more workers. Then the total 
gains from increasing marginally the wage is the increase in productivity due to this 
additional number of retained workers (LHS of equation (9)). The right-hand side 
accounts for the total cost increase, which comprises a higher bill due to the 
marginal increase in wage to be paid to all retained workers and the salaries to be 
paid to the additional amount of workers the firm manages to retain. 
As we noticed previously  =
j j
i λ λ
∗ ∗ for all  , i j . Moreover, it is easy to derive 





































∗ comes from equation (8). 
Definition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium for this economy consists of the policy 
functions  ,= 1 , . . , {() }
j
ij i j N i j λω ≠  and a vector of non-negative wages ({ },{ })
j
ii r ω  such that: 
a) the policy functions  ()
j
ij λ ω  and wage 
j
i r  solve the stage 2 problems and, b) the 
wage  i ω  solve the problem of stage 1 taking into account the solutions of the 2nd 
stage of the game.   
                                                                                                                                                              
that for the relevant range of  i ω  all  < ii ω ω
∗ (where  i ω








) the profit 
function is strictly increasing, while for all  > ii ω ω
∗, it is strictly decreasing. This is enough to 
prove that  i ω
∗ is a global maximum. See appendix for proof.    19
Proposition 3 With a strategic wage setting, there exists a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium with positive labor mobility for each set of parameters. If all non-
negativity constraints of wages are non-binding, then the equilibrium wages and 
levels of labor mobility are determined by equations (8) and (10). If some of the 
non-negativity constraints of wages are binding, then their corresponding 
equilibrium wages and labor poaching are  =0 i ω












.   
When all non-negativity constraints of wages are non-binding, we obtain an 
interior equilibrium. In contrast, an equilibrium with some of the non-negativity 
constraints binding is called corner equilibrium. The proof of the previous 
proposition is in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 3. Determination of the level of labor mobility for the sequential game  
(from equation (10)). 
 
Notice that the interior equilibrium level of labor mobility when mobility 
costs are zero is independent of the level of knowledge, so we obtain a symmetric 
equilibrium in the labor mobility (equation (10) is independent of k  when  =0 m ). 
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mobility rate is increasing with the level of knowledge.16 These are the same 
results we obtained in the basic model with perfect competition. 
The parameters  p and m affect the results also in accordance to previous 
findings. An increase in labor mobility cost (m) decreases labor poaching, while 
more general knowledge or less protected property rights (higher  p) translates into 
higher labor mobility. Moreover, when m is high, firms can prevent workers from 
moving with a lower wage, while higher  p requires higher wage to retain workers. 
Also the number of firms in the industry (N ) and the level of knowledge of the 
workers (k ) make it more difficult to retain workers and require a higher wage. 
The main difference with the basic model comes in terms of efficiency. 
While the basic model is efficient, the sequential game here analyzed presents some 
inefficiency due to the first-mover advantage. In particular we observe that the 
equilibrium wages are too low in the sequential game, which induces too much 
labor mobility in equilibrium. A complete efficiency analysis can be found in the 
appendix. 
 
5. Testable implications 
In this section we describe in detail the testable implications that come out 
from the previous theoretical analysis and relate them to recent studies. They are 
derived from the two labor market settings analyzed here since, as we showed, 
results are common to both of them. 
Implication 1. When workers have to incur a positive cost for moving across 
firms (change of residence, mobility costs,...), the level of knowledge of firms 
affects positively labor mobility. This has two further implications: 
a) Within an industry, we should observe higher mobility of those workers 
                                                 
16To illustrate this result see figure 3. An increase in k  moves the RHS of equation 10 upwards and the LHS stays 
the same. Thus, the equilibrium level of labor mobility grows.    21
hired initially by the leading firm (the most innovative). Thus this firm will suffer 
from losing more experienced labor than followers. 
b) Comparing across industries, we should observe a higher level of labor 
mobility on high-tech industries (which are associated to high level of knowledge), 
such as biotechnology, and less labor mobility on traditional type of industries 
(which in general require a lower level of knowledge). 
In the case of firms spread across the territory (we can even think of firms 
within an industry located in different countries) the level of knowledge affects 
labor mobility. This has two implications. First, ceteris paribus, technological 
leaders within an industry will lose a higher proportion of experienced workers 
than firms lagging behind. There are some cases that suggest this idea, such as the 
move of qualified workers from Sony to Samsung. This finding is also consistent 
with the fact that many startups use learning-by-hiring to access the knowledge of 
the leading firm. There is not, however, to our best knowledge, any comprehensive 
analysis including mobility of workers from leader to follower firms and vice versa. 
As for the analysis across industries, given two equally located industries, 
with similar parameters, we expect to observe higher labor mobility in the industry 
more technologically advanced. That is, we should observe higher labor mobility in 
high-tech industries than in traditional sectors after controlling for other factors. 
Empirical evidence is lacking again. However, the higher propensity to migrate for 
highly-skilled workers (engineers, technicians,...) as compared to average 
employees may suggest that this is the case. 
Implication 2. A high degree of generality of knowledge, a high level of 
absorptive capacity of firms and a proper institutional environment are essential 
features for having mobility of workers, even when firms are located together. 
There are three essential aspects to take into account when analyzing the 
level of labor mobility of an industry. First of all, the usability of knowledge across    22
firms. When the knowledge is industry-specific (as opposite to firm-specific), then 
there is room for diffusion of knowledge through the mobility of workers. 
Secondly, to make use of the external knowledge firms need the capacity to absorb 
and assimilate this knowledge. In particular, firms need to integrate adequately the 
poached workers into their labor force and encourage them to share their 
knowledge and apply it in the production function. Some organizational structures 
are more successful in this enterprise, namely horizontal rather than hierarchical 
ones, etc. (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998). And finally, the environment must be 
favorable for such labor mobility (no institutional constraints in the broadest sense: 
legal, social, political,...). This is to say that there must be no external factor to the 
firms that prevents labor mobility from occurring. We already commented the 
importance of covenants not to compete in explaining the differences in 
performance between Silicon Valley and Route 128. In the Third Italy the presence 
of extensive families played an important role for risk-sharing and allowed for a 
flexible labor market. These examples reveal that extremely different institutions 
may lead to an environment prone to labor mobility and that there is no unique 
recipe for creating a successful industrial cluster. What draws clearly from this 
analysis is that without all of these three factors, any attempt to create a learning 
region will fail. 
Implication 3. In general, results show that an increase in mobility costs 
pulls down the level of labor mobility. Thus, we should observe lower labor 
mobility between firms that are located far from each other, other things equal. 
High mobility costs reduce the firms' incentives to poach experienced 
workers from other firms because then it is more costly to attract such workers. 
Higher marginal costs move the optimal level of poaching down. This seems a 
sensible result, consistent for instance with the higher labor mobility experienced in 
the U.S. as compared to Europe. Mobility costs in the former are thought to be    23
lower due to language and cultural homogeneity across the territory. In contrast, 
within Europe, any worker is more likely to be more reticent about changing 
country of residence than moving within his/her own country. Notice that mobility 
costs may include the cost of adaptation to the new place of residence, the cost of 
learning the language, the emotional cost of moving, the cost of learning new job 
opportunities within the industry... apart from the monetary cost of the moving. 
Thus, there is room to reduce mobility costs by promoting the learning of foreign 
languages in the general population and reducing costs of searching for a job. 
Implication 4. Wages increase with the level of knowledge, the degree of 
generality of knowledge, the openness of the environment and the number of firms 
in the industry. Since most of these factors are associated with higher labor 
mobility too, it is expected to observe a positive correlation between the level of 
labor mobility and wages. 
Many authors have found that wages in industrial districts, where labor 
mobility is found to be higher than in the rest of the economy, are often above 
national averages (Triglia, 1992). With our model we show what may be driving 
this result. The higher level of knowledge is one important factor for observing 
high wages. Moreover, our model defines the real access firms have to this 
knowledge as another factor to take into account when analyzing wages. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We present an economy with two main features: labor mobility goes together 
with knowledge transfer and exchange of knowledge enhances productivity. We 
consider an industry with N  firms and non-rivalry in the product market. Either 
with perfect competition in the labor market or with sequential wage-setting we 
find that, as long as the knowledge is industry-specific and regional laws do not 
enforce clauses `not-to-compete' too strongly (i.e. positive  p in our model), then    24
there will be labor mobility in equilibrium. Moreover, clustering (lower m in our 
model) increases labor mobility. These conditions will create higher productivity in 
the whole industry. 
We find the following results: An increase in the ability to use external 
knowledge ( p in our model) as well as in the level of external knowledge ( j k ) 
translates into higher salaries to experienced workers. When firms cluster together 
(low  m), then it is harder to retain workers and firms must pay experienced 
workers higher wages ( i ω ). When the number of firms in the industry increases, 
then it is also more difficult to retain workers, so they are paid higher wage. 
Regarding labor mobility (
i λ ), it increases with the ability to use external 
knowledge ( p) and the level of such knowledge ( i k ). Higher mobility costs (m) 
lead to lower labor mobility and an increase in the size of the industry has an 
ambiguous effect on the total labor mobility. 
This labor mobility across firms could be the rationale to explain how the 
cooperation culture of some clusters was originated. Workers move but they keep 
in touch with some previous co-workers. This communication between former 
colleagues could be a substitute for labor mobility, or at least facilitate further the 
exchange of knowledge across firms. Agrawal, Cockburn and McHale (2006) give 
evidence in this direction. 
As for policy analysis, this model is far too partial. However, it gives a clear 
view that locating firms together, although it enhances labor mobility, is not 
enough for getting high production. The type of industry-knowledge and the 
regional institutions, as well as the level of absorptive capacity of firms, will be 
critical for developing a successful industrial cluster. 
The simplicity of our model makes it useful as a baseline to experiment with 
different hypotheses. One possibility is to introduce heterogeneity in the ability to    25
learn of young workers. This would allow us to analyze under which assumptions 
more capable workers are more prone to move and compare findings with real data. 
Another possible extension is to construct a general equilibrium model with 
dynamics. This can lead to an endogenous growth model, which can be useful to 
check robustness of the results of endogenous growth models with exogenous 
spillovers. An obvious extension of this work is to contrast empirically the 
implications of the model. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Here we prove that the economy with perfect competition in the labor market 
has a unique equilibrium and, moreover, it is interior. 
Equation (6) determines the value that 
i λ
∗ takes in equilibrium:  
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The LHS is increasing in 
i λ  with intercept  i k









. On the other hand, the RHS is decreasing in 
i λ  and convex. It goes to 
infinity at  =0
i λ  and tends to  m −  as 
i λ  goes to infinity. As shown in figure 1, the 






, that is, an interior solution. 
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(5')  
The LHS is decreasing and convex in  i ω . It has a positive asymptote at  =0 i ω  
and the limit as  i ω  goes to infinity is zero. The RHS is increasing and concave in 
i ω . It has a negative asymptote at  = i m ω −  and it goes to 1 as  i ω  grows to infinity.    28
As shown in figure 2, there is a unique solution, which corresponds to a positive 
wage  i ω . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In order to check the effect of changes in parameters on labor mobility and 
wages we will use equations (6) and (5) respectively. 
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An increase in  p does not affect the marginal productivity of retained 
workers (LHS(6)), yet it increases the marginal productivity of poached workers 
(RHS(6)). Thus the LHS in figure 1 does not change, while the RHS shifts up. In 
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At the same time, an increase in  p shifts up the RHS in figure 2, which 
results in higher wage for type-i worker. 
 

















An increase in m affects only the marginal productivity of poached workers 
(RHS(6)), negatively. Thus, in figure 1, the RHS shifts down and we obtain a lower 
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It also shifts up the RHS(5'), which implies a lower wages in the new 
equilibrium (figure 2). 
 
Effects of N on labor mobility and wages 
 
2 (6)


















An increase in N  affects positively the marginal productivity of retained 
workers (LHS(6)), while marginal productivity of poached workers (RHS(6)) 
remains the same. Thus, LHS shifts up in figure 1 and the new equilibrium has a 























An increase in  N  affects only the RHS of equation (5'), shifting it down.    30
This gives higher wages in equilibrium. 
 
Effects of k on labor mobility and wages 
To analyze the effects of k  on labor mobility we use equation (6). See figure 
1 from the appendix to illustrate it. From equation (6) we know that an increase in 
k  shifts the RHS to the right and the LHS to the left. Thus, in general, we should 
say that the total effect of this increase on the equilibrium level of labor mobility is 
ambiguous. Notice however that the first derivative of the RHS and the LHS with 
respect to  j k  valued at 
j λ
∗ gives us by how much each curve shifts respectively at 
this point. 
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mobility is lower than the original one, and vice versa, if  >
== j jj j jj
RHS LHS
kk




then the new equilibrium level of labor mobility is higher. 
Using equation (6) which holds in equilibrium, we can rewrite the derivative 
of the LHS with respect to  j k  as 
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subtract it from the derivative of the RHS with respect to  j k  and we obtain 
the necessary condition to have higher labor mobility when knowledge increases: 
  >0 . m α      31
The previous condition holds whenever  >0 m . When  =0 m , then the level of 
knowledge does not affect labor mobility in equilibrium.  
Next we study how k  affects wages. The higher the level of knowledge, the 
higher the demand for experienced workers, so the higher the equilibrium wages. In 
equation (6) if k  increases, the wage ω must increase too in order to recover the 
equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
We want to prove here the existence and uniqueness of the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of the strategic game stated in Proposition 3. We do this in three steps. 
First, we check that 
i λ
∗ exists and is unique. Second, we prove that the stage 1 
problem is well-defined. Finally we check that the equilibrium wage is unique and 
positive. 
Step 1: 








































 (10)  
To check existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, first we want to analyze 










. The range of 
i λ
∗ is easy to determine. To have an 
equilibrium we need that the total amount of workers poached from firm i is lower 
than supply of type i experienced workers. This means that (1 ) < 1
i N λ
∗ − , which 
gives the upper-bound of the range. The lower-bound is obvious, since we can not    32
poach a negative amount of workers. 





. It starts with a 
positive slope at  =0 ,
i λ  but slope is decreasing as 
i λ  increases, eventually getting 
negative. 
 































The LHS is a convex strictly increasing function, it goes through the origin 








 is infinite. Moreover, the slope at  =0 i λ
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Given this information we draw the LHS and the RHS in figure 3, which 
shows that they only cross once and the optimal  i λ
∗ belongs to the required interval. 
Step 2: 
Now we prove that the maximization problem in the stage 1 from the 
sequential wage setting model is well-defined in the relevant range of  i ω . We need 
to prove that the solution to the problem is a global maximum. 
Let us first define the relevant range for  i ω . From equation (8) we can 
translate the range of 
i λ
∗ in terms of  i ω
∗. The upper-bound for 
i λ  becomes a lower-
bound for  i ω , while there is no upper-bound to  i ω . In particular, the relevant range 
for  i ω  is 
1 (( 1) , ) i Np k m
αα α
− −− + ∞ .    33
The first order condition, once we introduce that  =( )
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The RHS is increasing and concave. It has an asymptote at  = m ω −  to minus 
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The LHS has two asymptotes: one at  = m ω −  and another at 
1 =( 1 ) Np k m
αα ωα
− −− . We study only the function in the relevant range of ω, that 
is, on the right side of the second asymptote. For low enough values of ω the LHS 
is decreasing, however, as ω gets sufficiently large, the function increases. The 
value of the LHS at 
1 =( 1 ) Np k m
αα ωα
− −−  is +∞, and the function goes to zero as ω 
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Given these characteristics, Figure 4 shows that there is only one 
equilibrium. Moreover, since the LHS is strictly above the RHS on the left of ω
∗ 






all  < ii ω ω





 for all  < ii ω ω
∗, which proves that the profit function is quasi-   34
concave in the wage and that ω
∗ is the unique global maximum. 
 
   
Figure 4A. Case with non-binding non-negativity of ω 
 
Figure 4B. Case with non-negativity of wage binding. 
 
Figure 4. Determination of wage for the sequential game  













ω*    35
Step 3: 
Now it is only left to check that the optimal wage is non-negative. 
When 
1 =( 1 ) 0 Np k m
αα ωα
− − −≥, then we have always a positive wage in 
equilibrium (Figure 4A). 
When the last condition is not satisfied, we need that the  (0) (0) LHS RHS ≥  in 
equation (10), that is, that the intercept of the LHS must be higher than the intercept 
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When the non-negativity condition for wage is binding for some firm i, then 











 (Figure 4B). 
To sum up, we can find two types of equilibria: 
- interior equilibrium with positive labor mobility and non-negative wage. 
- corner equilibrium, where the non-negativity constraint of wage is binding 
for some firms. In this case, the equilibrium wage for these firms is zero, while for 
the other firms the optimal wage is the same as in the interior equilibrium. 
 
Welfare analysis 
In this section we investigate if labor flows occur at the efficient level in both 
equilibria we found. In order to address this issue, we first determine the conditions 
that ensure efficiency in labor mobility, which will be then compared to the 
equilibrium conditions. For the former, we need to solve the following problem 
where a social planner maximizes the total production net of mobility costs. This    36
will determine the efficient conditions because we assumed perfect competition in 
the product market. In this section, we are not interested about how rents are 
distributed, but we want to characterize the allocation of labor that maximizes net 
production. It can be checked that the maximization problem is well-defined. 
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The first order conditions for the social planner's problem are the following:  
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They say that, in an efficient equilibrium, net marginal productivity of each 
type of worker must be equalized across firms. Thus, an additional worker 
specialized in knowledge  i k  should produce m units more when he changes firms 
in order to cover the mobility costs. It can be proved that there is symmetry in 
terms of i. That is, all firms poaching from firm  j will poach the same amount 
j λ . 
Thus we can rewrite the equation as 
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Next we present the comparison between the first order conditions from the 
planner's problem and the solutions from the previous models in order to check for 
efficiency. 
Basic model (with perfect competition in the labor market) 
In the case of perfect competition in the labor market, we obtain an efficient 
equilibrium. It is straightforward to check it since equations (6) and (14) are 
identical. 
Sequential game model 
To check if efficiency conditions hold in equilibrium, we use equations (8) 
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which combined give 
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Comparing equation (14) to (15), we can say that, in general, equilibrium 




− −  is the net marginal productivity of 
a worker type i working in another firm, whereas 




− −−  is the 
marginal productivity of a worker type i hired by firm i. Equation (15) shows that 
in the sequential game equilibrium 
11 (1 ( 1) ) >
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negative. In other words, the marginal productivity of workers type i is lower in 
any other firm than in firm i. Thus, we could increase total production by having a 
lower 
i λ
∗, or what is the same, lower mobility of workers. This means that there is 
too much labor mobility in equilibrium. The inefficiency appears because firms 
have some market power on their workers since they set wages first. The result is, 
as in any other case of market power, that the firms set lower wages, which implies 
too much labor mobility. 
 